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Abstract
An important recent theoretical literature argues that the threat of exit can represent an
e⁄ective form of governance when the blockholder is a principal. However, a signi￿cant
fraction of equity blocks is held by delegated portfolio managers. How do agency frictions
arising from the delegation of portfolio management a⁄ect the ability of blockholders to
govern via the threat of exit? We show that when blockholders are su¢ ciently career
concerned exit will fail as a disciplining device. Our results have testable implications on
the relative degree to which di⁄erent classes of delegated portfolio managers use exit as
a form of governance.
1 Introduction
Publicly traded corporations are a⁄ected by a core agency problem: managers pay the full
cost of e⁄ort in running the corporations but shareholders enjoy most of the bene￿ts. When
ownership is dispersed individual shareholders have little incentive to monitor managers and
little ability to in￿ uence them. Holders of equity blocks (￿blockholders￿ ) are a natural solu-
tion to this problem. Because they own many shares they have both the incentive to monitor
and the ability to in￿ uence management. Several well-known papers (e.g. Grossman and Hart
(1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Admati, P￿ eiderer, and Zechner (1994) and Kahn and
Winton (1998)) have shown that blockholders can increase ￿rm value through monitoring
and activism. Activism can take the form of bringing forth shareholder proposals, proxy
voting against management, informal negotiations with management, jawboning etc. These
activities are collectively referred to as the use of ￿voice￿by blockholders.
￿We are grateful to Ulf Axelson, Alex Edmans, Elena Carletti, Oliver Hart, Gustavo Manso, Dimitri
Vayanos, Michela Verardo, Ernst Ludvig von Thadden and seminar audiences at EUI Florence, LSE, and
UCL for helpful comments. We thank the Paul Woolley Centre at the LSE for ￿nancial support. Email:
a.dasgupta@lse.ac.uk, g.piacentino@lse.ac.uk.
1An alternative potential way to enhance ￿rm value is through the threat of exit: if manage-
ment acts suboptimally, blockholders can simply sell their blocks￿ the so-called ￿Wall Street
Walk￿ . The exit of a blockholder will typically depress the stock price, punishing manage-
ment whenever executive compensation is linked to the market price of equity. However,
exit also imposes costs on the blockholder￿ she liquidates blocks at potentially unfavourable
prices. A natural question thus arises: Can the threat to exit act as an e⁄ective form of
governance and enhance shareholders￿value?
A growing theoretical literature starting with Admati and P￿ eiderer (2009) and Edmans
(2009) answers this question in the a¢ rmative. Admati and P￿ eiderer argue that when
blockholders observe managers acting suboptimally, it is in their own best interest to exit
early before information about the manager￿ s actions become public. This makes exit a
credible threat which then ameliorates managerial misbehaviour and enhances ￿rm value.
Edmans argues that informed institutional trading enhances the informational e¢ ciency of the
￿rm￿ s equity in the secondary market, enabling myopic managers to make better investment
decisions and thus enhancing ￿rm value.
This literature treats the blockholder as a pro￿t maximizing principal: she acts as an
individual owner of an equity block would. In contrast to this assumption, at least a signi￿cant
proportion of equity blocks is held by institutional investors who are delegated portfolio
managers.1 In addition, a growing empirical literature (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997,
1999), Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), and Dass,
Massa, and Patgiri (2008)) documents that these delegated investors face implicit incentives
that make their behaviour deviate from what is in the best interest of purely pro￿t maximizing
principals. In particular, the literature shows that, to varying degrees, di⁄erent classes of
portfolio managers face career concerns: In addition to compensation explicitly linked to
their pro￿ts, they also receive uncontingent fees based on the amount of money they manage,
which leads them to compete to retain existing clients and win new ones.
In this paper we ask how the contractual incentives of funds interacts with their ability to
monitor via the threat of exit. Taking as a baseline the model of Admati and P￿ eiderer (2009),
we show that the career concerns of delegated blockholders may interfere with their ability
to credibly threaten management by exit. In Admati and P￿ eiderer, when a blockholder
observes perverse behaviour on the part of the management of ￿rms in which she holds a
1Institutional money managers hold over 70% of publicly traded US equity (see for example Gillan and
Starks (2007)), and a signi￿cant measure of these holdings is quite concentrated. For example, Hawley and
Williams (2007) point out that, in 2005 the hundred largest US institutions owned 52% of publicly held
equity. In addition, Gopalan (2008) notes that in 2001 almost 60% of NYSE-listed ￿rms had an institutional
blockholder with at least 5% equity ownership. Finally, Davis and Yoo (2003) point out that large mutual
fund families, such as Fidelity, own sizeable blocks in a majority of large US corporations.
2block, she faces a choice between selling the block early or retaining it until all information
becomes public at a later date. As long as there is any noise in the interim-date market, it is
always in the interest of the blockholder to sell early rather than late. This, in turn, punishes
management, making exit an e⁄ective form of governance.
We show that, when the blockholder is a su¢ ciently career-concerned delegated portfolio
manager, exit can no longer act as an e⁄ective form of governance. The core intuition, which
we ￿ esh out in greater detail below, is that exit may be informative about the ability of
the fund to generate value for investors. The signalling role of exit may impair its discipli-
nary potential. Thus, when blockholders are delegated portfolio managers who compete for
investors￿￿ ows, they may be less successful in using the threat of exit to govern.
Focusing on the ability of institutional investors to govern via exit is all the more relevant
today because there is growing recognition that the degree of traditional stewardship by these
investors is limited at best. In the aftermath of the ￿nancial crisis, this has led practitioners
and regulators to produce recommendations (e.g. Paul Woolley￿ s (2010) ￿Manifesto for Gi-
ant Funds￿ ) and codes of conduct (e.g. the UK Financial Reporting Council￿ s (2010) ￿UK
Stewardship Code￿ ) aimed at improving the degree of engagement and activism by these
blockholders. Thus, our results, which suggest that some classes of institutional blockholders
may not be able to e⁄ectively use the alternative form of governance￿ exit￿ underscore the
importance of this regulatory e⁄ort to enhance funds￿activism.
Our model features a manager who runs a ￿rm and a fund who holds an equity block in
that ￿rm on the behalf of a set of investors who employ her to manage their money. There
are three dates. At date 0, the manager may take some perverse action that reduces the
value of the ￿rm but endows him with private bene￿ts. The amount by which he lowers the
value of the ￿rm by taking the perverse action is private information to the manager until
date 2, when all information becomes public. The fund can observe the manager￿ s actions
and can choose whether to sell the block of shares at date 1 or to hold on to it until date 2.
Funds come in two types. Good funds are better monitors than bad funds. While good
funds can, via monitoring, eliminate the managers access to the perverse action, bad funds
can do so only with positive probability. As a result, if at the end of the game an investor
is matched with a good fund, he attains a higher continuation payo⁄ than if he is matched
with a bad one.
The investors￿initial match with the fund is random and they do not know the type of
their fund at date 0. At both dates 1 and 2 investors observe the fund￿ s portfolio value and
can make inferences about her type. Based on such inferences, at each of these dates investors
can choose to retain the fund or replace her with a randomly selected fund. If investors choose
to retain the fund at both dates 1 and 2, their expected continuation value depends on their
3endogenous belief about the type of the fund based on all information received.
The fund cares about investors￿perception of her ability. This is because, for each period
that she is employed, she receives a ￿xed wage w. In addition to this, she also receives a
fraction ￿ of any liquidating portfolio value (at date 1 or 2, depending on when the portfolio
is liquidated), with the investors receiving the rest. The fund￿ s payo⁄ parameters ￿ and
w represent, respectively, the fund￿ s compensation sensitivity to earned pro￿ts and investor
￿ ows. While the ￿rst is obvious, the latter deserves further mention. The fund can be retained
or ￿red at date 1. While the pro￿t-contingent component of compensation may either rise
or fall as a result of these events, the uncontingent component of compensation is certainly
higher if the fund is retained instead of ￿red at date 1. It is in this sense that the size of
w captures the fund￿ s concern for ￿ ows: it is only by retaining the current investors (i.e.,
preventing out￿ ows) that the fund can earn w for another period. The relative size of ￿ vs w,
in turn, captures the relative importance of explicit (pro￿t-related) vs implicit (￿ ow-related)
compensation.
We show two main results:
1. First, we prove an impossibility result. We show that when the fund is su¢ ciently ￿ ow
sensitive (i.e., w is large relative to ￿), and when good funds generate su¢ ciently higher
continuation value for investors than bad ones, it is impossible in equilibrium for any
type of fund to credibly threaten the manager by exit conditional on the perverse action
being taken. Thus, in sharp contrast to Admati and P￿ eiderer (2009), exit cannot act
as a form of governance when the blockholder is su¢ ciently career concerned. The
intuition is as follows.
For exit to impose discipline, funds must sell in equilibrium if they observe the perverse
action being taken. Since good funds can eliminate the perverse action without the
need to exit, the only funds that can be seen to exit must be the bad ones. But then
exit reveals that the fund is of the bad type, which will induce the investor to ￿re the
fund. When observing the perverse action being taken, the bad fund faces the following
choice: She may either hold the block, be retained by the investor and earn w for an
extra period, but su⁄er from an ￿￿share of smaller pro￿ts at t = 2, or she may sell the
block early, be ￿red by the investor and lose the assets-under-management fee for the
second period, but realize larger pro￿ts on the actual position. When w is large and ￿
is small, the former option is more attractive.
For this argument to be valid, it is not just necessary for investors to ￿re the fund
conditional on an early block sale, but also to retain the fund in the absence of such a
sale. Why would investors choose to pay w for an extra period when the fund cannot
take any further productive actions on their behalf during t = 2? They would do so
4because by retaining the fund, they gather further information about her type. Since
investors would rather be matched with a good rather than a bad fund at the end of
the game, this additional information is valuable to them. Indeed, it is most valuable￿
and worth paying w for an extra period￿ precisely when good and bad funds produce
su¢ ciently di⁄erent continuation values.
2. To endow our results with empirical content, we then proceed to show what can arise in
equilibrium. We show that, when good funds generate su¢ ciently higher continuation
value for investors than bad ones: (i) when w is large relative to ￿, there exists an
equilibrium in which no fund chooses to exit conditional on the perverse action being
taken by the manager; in contrast (ii) when w is small relative to ￿, the fund is credibly
able to use exit as a disciplining device.
Thus, the e⁄ectiveness of exit as a governance mechanism will be determined by vari-
ations in the contractual incentives of the delegated blockholder. Across the di⁄erent
classes of delegated portfolio managers, there is clear variation in the size of ￿
w. For
example, mutual funds typically receive no explicit pro￿t-based compensation. Thus,
the vast majority of mutual funds have ￿
w = 0. Other portfolio managers, such as, for
example, hedge funds derive a signi￿cant fraction of their payo⁄s from explicit pro￿t-
based compensation. For these investment vehicles, ￿
w >> 0. Thus, our results suggest
that mutual funds would be less e⁄ective in using exit as a disciplining device than
hedge funds. We discuss empirical evidence consistent with our result below.
Our analysis relates most directly to the relatively recent theoretical literature that shows
that the threat of exit is, in itself, a governance mechanism. Apart from the papers of Admati
and P￿ eiderer (2009) and Edmans (2009) that we have already noted above, this literature
includes the work of Gopalan (2008) and Edmans and Manso (2011). Gopalan (2008) presents
a model in which a privately informed blockholder can impact the probability of takeover
through trading and therefore can in￿ uence ￿rm governance. Edmans and Manso (2011)
consider the trade-o⁄ between voice and exit and solve for the number of blockholders which
maximizes ￿rm value. In contrast to these papers, which treat the blockholder as a principal,
we focus on the delegated nature of blockholding. This new literature on exit, as well as
our work, builds on a large theoretical literature on the role of blockholders in corporate
governance.2 That literature typically focuses on the role and incentives of the blockholder
to monitor, rather than focusing on exit itself as a governance mechanism.
2See, for example, Maug (1998), Mello and Repullo (2004), Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), Bolton
and von Thadden (1998), Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), Tirole (2001), and Noe (2002) in addition to the
papers cited earlier in the introduction.
5Our paper also has a familial connection to the growing literature on the ￿nancial equi-
librium implications of the career concerns of funds (see, for example, Dasgupta and Prat
(2008), Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011b), or Guerrieri and Kondor (2011)). These papers
establish a link between fund managers￿career concerns and the equilibrium prices, returns,
and volume of assets they trade. In contrast, we focus on the implications of funds￿career
concerns and the nature of corporate governance in ￿rms in which they hold equity blocks.
The growing empirical literature on exit as a governance mechanism has not, to date,
focussed on delegation per se. This literature nevertheless provides a number of ￿ndings that
are broadly consistent with our model. Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) were the ￿rst to
empirically investigate the role of exit as a governance mechanism. Amongst other things,
they showed that the degree to which institutions use exit may depend on their type. Using
the CDA/Spectrum classi￿cation of institutions (into Bank Trusts, Insurance Companies,
Independent Investment Advisors, Investment Companies and Others) they ￿nd that, for the
years 1982 to 1993, bank trusts are greater users of exit than investment companies. While
the aggregate nature of 13-F ￿lings and the legal nature of the CDA/Spectrum classi￿cation
warrant a degree of caution in interpreting their ￿ndings in the context of our model, it is
likely that the average bank trust is less in￿ uenced by investor ￿ ows than, say, a traditional
mutual fund company which would typically appear under investment companies under the
CDA/Spectrum classi￿cation. Thus, this evidence is broadly consistent with our theoretical
result that ￿ ow-sensitive institutions would be less e⁄ective in using exit. Duan and Jiao
(2011) and Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2011) both show that voice is more important
than exit for di⁄erent institutional investors. Duan and Jiao (2011) use CRSP mutual fund
holding data and ISS voting data from 2003 to 2006 and ￿nd that mutual funds are more
likely to oppose management through proxy voting than to exit. When combined with other
evidence (see, for example, Kahan and Rock (2007) and Gillan and Starks (2007)) that mutual
funds are loath to vote against management in general, this suggests that this category of
blockholder rarely uses exit as a form of governance. Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2011)
instead use 13-F data from 1982 to 2004 to show that for institutional investors voice is more
important than exit in forcing CEO removal. This ￿nding is also broadly consistent with
our model. Suppose we interpret the type-dependent monitoring technology in our model
as the e⁄ective use of voice. Then, since all institutions can use voice, but only relatively
￿ ow-insensitive institutions will use exit, our model would also predict that ￿averaged across
types of institutions ￿exit will be less e⁄ective than voice in corporate governance.
Our paper engages with the empirical literature in another, more subtle, way. While our
discussion to date has treated exit as an alternative to voice, it is sometimes asserted that
the threat of exit supports shareholders￿voice. This idea dates back at least to Hirschman
6(1970, p. 82), who writes: ￿The chances for voice to function e⁄ectively...are appreciably
strengthened if voice is backed up by the threat of exit, whether it is made openly or whether
the possibility of exit is merely well understood to be an element in the situation.￿Viewed
from this angle, our theoretical ￿nding that mutual funds can less credibly threaten to exit
than hedge funds implies di⁄erential success across these classes of institutions in the e⁄ective
use of voice. Knowing that mutual funds￿exit threat is not credible, management will also
be less attentive to their voice. As a result, mutual funds may rationally spend less time and
e⁄ort in using voice. In contrast, hedge funds￿ability to credibly threaten exit will make them
keen and successful users of voice. There is a growing body of empirical papers that provides
evidence that hedge funds produce substantial gains to shareholders of target companies by
using voice (see, for example, Becht, Franks, and Grant (2010), Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and
Partnoy (2008), and Klein and Zur (2009)). In contrast, however, it is commonly observed
that mutual funds do not use voice to a similar degree. For example, Kahan and Rock (2007)
argue that mutual funds do not typically sponsor shareholder proposals, do not uniformly
use proxy voting to improve corporate governance, and do not even seem to make signi￿cant
demands to management during ￿behind-the-scenes￿negotiations. The ￿silence￿of mutual
funds is also evident from the survey of Gillan and Starks (2007), who list the prominent
roles of di⁄erent institutional investors in using voice across di⁄erent decades since the 1930s.
Viewed through the lens of Hirschman￿ s hypothesis, this evidence is entirely consistent with
our theoretical results.3
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we introduce the underlying
governance problem. Section 3 reviews Admati and P￿ eiderer￿ s core result that exit can act
as a governance mechanism when the blockholder is a principal. Then, in section 4 we enrich
the analysis by introducing delegated blockholding by funds. Section 5 shows that when
these funds are su¢ ciently career concerned the threat of exit fails to improve governance.
Section 6 characterizes equilibria with and without exit. In section 7 we discuss our results
and consider variations and extensions. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Governance Problem
We consider a publicly traded all equity-￿nanced ￿rm with a given ownership structure. We
ask how changes in the ownership structure￿ the presence of blockholders of di⁄erent types￿
can in￿ uence the nature of corporate governance in that ￿rm. The underlying model of the
3Needless to say, there may well be many reasons why mutual funds are not e⁄ective users of voice, such
as, for example, business ties with portfolio ￿rms (see Davis and Kim (2007) or Dasgupta and Zachariadis
(2010)). In general, the higher-powered incentives of hedge funds may induce them to spend more e⁄ort on
activism.
7￿rm is identical to that of Admati and P￿ eiderer (2009).4
The ￿rm exists over three dates (t = 0;1;2). It is run by a manager and is characterized
by a moral hazard problem. The manager may take an action (action 1) which is undesirable
from the point of view of shareholders but generates private bene￿ts ￿ for him. We refer
to this as the ￿perverse action,￿as in Admati and P￿ eiderer. If the manager does not take
action 1, we write that he takes action 0.
The value of the ￿rm at t = 2 is a⁄ected by the manager￿ s action choice at t = 0￿
a 2 f0;1g. If he chooses a = 0 the value of the ￿rm is v. If he chooses a = 1, the value




with a continuous density f(￿). The
manager observes the realisation of ~ ￿ at t = 0 and then chooses his action. The value of v is
common knowledge throughout, but realisation of ~ ￿ is private information available only to
the manager at t = 0;1. All information becomes public at t = 2.
We assume, following Admati and P￿ eiderer, that the manager￿ s contractual payo⁄ de-
pends on the market prices at t = 1 and t = 2. If he takes action 0, his payo⁄is !1P1+!2P2,
where !1 > 0 and !2 > 0 represent the sensitivities of managerial compensation to mar-
ket prices P1 and P2 at times 1 and 2. If the manager instead takes action 1, his payo⁄ is
!1P1 + !2P2 + ￿, where ￿ ￿ 0 is ￿xed and common knowledge.
The ￿rm is publicly traded, and the prices P1 and P2 are set by a risk-neutral market
maker on the basis of all available public information. The ￿rm￿ s equity is the only risky
asset in the economy. The only other available asset is a risk-free asset with unit gross rate
of return and that is in in￿nitely elastic supply.
The ￿rm is owned by many small passive direct shareholders as well as by a large block-
holder. The identity of the blockholder will change across di⁄erent variants of our model. In
the baseline case, which is identical to Admati and P￿ eiderer￿ s, the blockholder is a principal,
and we think of her as a large private blockholding investor. In the core of our paper, mo-
tivated by the large degree of blockholding by institutional asset managers in Anglo-Saxon
￿nancial systems, we think of the blockholder as a fund who acts on behalf of a continuum
of identical investors.
In all variants, the blockholder is able to observe the action chosen by the manager at
t = 0, and is able to sell her stake in the ￿rm at t = 1 in response. Because the blockholder￿ s
potential sales are based on her observation of the manager￿ s action, which in turn a⁄ects
4To be precise, we focus on Admati and P￿ eiderer￿ s Model B. This is the version of the model in which
they show exit to be most e⁄ective as a governance mechanism. In other variants of their model, they show
that￿ even when the blockholder is a principal￿ exit has potentially less desirable e⁄ects. We wish to take as
a starting point the version of their model that gives exit its best chance as a governance mechanism and still
show (see Proposition 1 below) that agency frictions arising from the delegation of portfolio management can
reduce its e⁄ectiveness.
8￿rm value, the price at the interim date (t = 1) will be a⁄ected by the trading decision of
the blockholder. This, in turn, will a⁄ect the payo⁄s of the manager, generating the core
corporate governance mechanism. If the blockholder can credibly threaten to exit when the
manager takes action 1, thus lowering the ￿rm￿ s traded price at t = 1, the resulting reduction
in payo⁄ to the manager can induce him to take the perverse action less often, thus reducing
the agency costs and increasing the value of the ￿rm.
It is useful at the outset to outline the incidence of the perverse action in the absence of
a blockholder. In such a setting, since small shareholders are passive (implicitly, they have
neither the skill nor the incentive to acquire private information about the manager￿ s actions)
the price of the ￿rm at t = 1 is insensitive to the manager￿ s choice of action. Accordingly,
the manager compares his rents from taking the perverse action ￿ + !1P1 + !2(v ￿ ￿) with
that of taking the non-perverse action !1P1 + !2v; he takes the perverse action if and only
if ~ ￿ ￿
￿
!2 =: ￿No￿L.
In what follows, we consider whether the presence of di⁄erent types of blockholders can
reduce the incidence of the manager￿ s perverse action. We begin with the important bench-
mark case in which the blockholder acts as a principal. This is the case considered by Admati
and P￿ eiderer.
3 The Blockholder as Principal: Governance via Exit
Admati and P￿ eiderer (2009) show that when the blockholder acts as a principal, the threat
of exit can act as a disciplining device. We sketch their result here.
An equilibrium of the game is disciplining if the blockholder can credibly commit to sell
her holdings at t = 1 if the manager takes the perverse action. Since, taking the perverse
action in a disciplining equilibrium reduces the contractual payo⁄ to the manager via a
lowered interim price P1, the incidence of the perverse action is strictly lower in a disciplining
equilibrium than in the equilibrium in the absence of a blockholder. Admati and P￿ eiderer
show that there exists a unique equilibrium and it is always disciplining. Their equilibrium is
characterised by a cuto⁄ ￿L < ￿No￿L such that the manager takes the perverse action if and
only if ~ ￿ < ￿L and the large blockholder sells her shares if the manager takes that action.
The intuition for the result is as follows. Admati and P￿ eiderer￿ s blockholder may face a
liquidity shock at t = 1 with probability ￿ 2 (0;1) which forces her to liquidate her position.
This allows her to gain from trade when she is not hit by a liquidity shock and observes the
fund taking the perverse action: the market maker does not know the large shareholder￿ s
motive to trade. When the blockholder observes that the manager has taken the perverse
action at t = 1, she realizes that the ￿rm￿ s value will be lower at t = 2 when all information
9becomes public. If she has not been hit by the liquidity shock she has the choice to hold her
block until t = 2, and realize these gains or sell at t = 1. Of course, her sale at t = 1 will
lower the price of the block, because her trade may re￿ ect her private information. However,
because the market assigns positive probability to the sale being driven by the blockholder￿ s
liquidity shock rather than by private information, the loss in value from the early sale will
be smaller than the loss from holding until t = 2. Thus, the blockholder will exit, lowering
P1. Knowing this, the manager will hesitate to take the perverse action.
We now turn to the case where the blockholder is not a principal, but an agent: In the
remainder of the paper, the blockholder is a delegated portfolio manager who holds shares
on behalf of many (identical) small investors.
4 The Blockholder as Agent: A Model
We consider now the case where the blockholder is a delegated portfolio manager such as a
mutual fund, hedge fund, pension fund, etc. We assume that these delegated blockholders
act on behalf of a large number of small investors who would have no access to blockholding
other than via delegation. We do not analyse interactions amongst investors at this stage.
Instead, we treat all investors symmetrically. As a result, in what follows, we shall often
refer to this collection of investors simply as ￿the investor￿(I). We refer to the delegated
blockholder as the fund (F). The delegated blockholder, like the principal blockholder of the
previous section, can observe the manager￿ s actions at t = 0, and can choose whether to exit
at t = 1 or hold until t = 2.
As discussed in the introduction, an important strand of the empirical literature has
documented that investors chase performance across funds of di⁄erent ability, generating
career (or reputational) concerns for these funds. We consider how the career concerns
of funds may impact their e⁄ectiveness in monitoring via the threat of exit. In order to
incorporate career concerns, we augment the model by adding some crucial, but minimal,
ingredients.
First, we assume a degree of heterogeneity across funds. There are two types of funds:
good funds (￿F = g) and bad funds (￿F =b), with Pr(￿F =g) = ￿F. Good funds are better
monitors than bad funds: by monitoring, good funds are able to eliminate the manager￿ s
access to the perverse action, while bad funds can do so only with probability ￿M < 1.5
Our baseline results are insensitive to whether funds know their type. In addition, during
an unmodelled ￿nal period (period 2+) a good fund if matched to the investor generates a
5Our qualitative results will hold as long as the good fund is able to eliminate, via monitoring, access to
the perverse action with higher probability than the bad fund.
10continuation payo⁄ to the investor of ￿I
g. If, instead, the investor ends up matched to a bad
fund, his payo⁄ is ￿I
b < ￿I
g.6 The fund that is employed by the investor during this ￿nal
period, receives a payo⁄ of ￿F ￿ 0.7
Second, we introduce a hiring and replacement process between investors and funds which
induces career concerns for funds. The set up is as follows. The investor does not know the
type of the fund at t = 0 and he is randomly matched to one. Both at t = 1 and t = 2 he can
update his inference about the type of the fund that he is randomly matched to: at t = 1 he
observes the price of the fund￿ s portfolio (which depends on whether the fund sold or not)
and at t = 2 he observes the realisation of ~ ￿. At either t = 1 or t = 2, the investor may either
retain or ￿re his fund. The fund who is ￿red at t dies immediately and cannot be rehired.8
The investor can only hire a new fund at t = 2.9 If he hires a new fund, the match is random,
and thus the investor￿ s continuation value in the ￿nal period is ￿ ￿I := ￿F￿I
g + (1 ￿ ￿F)￿I
b. If,
on the other hand he chooses to retain his fund at both t = 1 and t = 2, then his continuation
value depends on his endogenous beliefs about the type of the fund to whom he was matched
at t = 0. The investor￿ s beliefs are equilibrium quantities and are computed below in the
relevant contexts. Thus, both at t = 1 and at t = 2, the investor makes a rational decision in
equilibrium to retain or ￿re his current fund on the basis of information observed up to that
point.
Third, we introduce rents from employment for funds: The reason funds care about
investor￿ s perception of their ability is that, for each period that they are employed, they
receive a ￿xed wage w. In addition to this, the fund also receives a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of
any liquidating portfolio value (at t = 1 or at t = 2, depending on when the portfolio is
6For concreteness, consider a ￿nal single period in which there is a new independent project, with payo⁄
v
0, run by a manager who can lower the value to v
0 ￿ ￿
0 by taking some perverse action. The good type
of fund if employed by the investor, can costlessly eliminate this perverse action. The bad type can do so
only probabilistically. This generates a di⁄erence in continuation values across matches with di⁄erent types
of funds.
More generally, such a continuation value will be endogenously generated (in equilibrium) of an in￿nitely
repeated version of our game. Such an extended formulation would come at a signi￿cant algebraic cost, which
would distract from our core message.
7Our model is isomorphic to one in which managerial ability is de￿ned by skill at ￿stock picking￿(a more
common formulation in the literature outside corporate governance). Good funds are simply better stock
pickers￿ they can identify ￿rms that have no agency problems, while bad funds only can do so probabilistically.
8Implicitly, there is a su¢ ciently signi￿cant reputational loss from being ￿red. Alternatively, it could be
that funds are simply indistinguishable from each other by an investor who is not in a current employment
relationship with them￿ thus a ￿red fund cannot be identi￿ed to be rehired.
9This is without loss of generality, because there are no productive investments between t = 1 and t = 2,
so a fund hired by the investor at t = 1 cannot take any actions to a⁄ect the investor￿ s payo⁄. By the same
token, since a new fund if hired at t = 1 takes no action, observing ￿ at t = 2 conveys no information about
the type of this newly hired fund. Thus, the investor would have no incentive to hire a new fund until t = 2.
11liquidated), with the investor receiving the rest.10 The investor￿ s payo⁄ is complementary to
the fund￿ s in the sense that he pays a ￿xed wage to the fund in each period he employs the
fund and gets a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of the liquidating portfolio.
It is worth pointing out here that the fund￿ s payo⁄parameters ￿ and w represent, respec-
tively, the fund￿ s compensation sensitivity to earned pro￿ts and investor ￿ ows. The fund can
be retained or ￿red at t = 1. While the pro￿t-contingent component of compensation may
either rise or fall, depending on the sequence of events, the pro￿t-uncontingent component
of compensation is certainly higher if the fund is retained instead of ￿red at t = 1. It is in
this sense that the size of w captures the fund￿ s concern for ￿ ows: it is only by retaining the
current investors (i.e., preventing out￿ ows) that the fund can earn w for another period. The
relative size of ￿ vs w, in turn, captures the relative importance of explicit (pro￿t-related)
and implicit (￿ ow-related) compensation.
Finally, to match the liquidity shock of Admati and P￿ eiderer (2009) in our revised
context, we assume that the investor has a probability ￿ 2 (0;1) of being impatient￿ of
receiving a shock that forces him to liquidate his holding at t = 1. When a block liquidation
occurs at t = 1, the market cannot tell whether it is the investor or the fund who initiated
the sale. However, needless to say, the investor knows the source of the liquidation.11
4.1 Some useful notation
It is useful to introduce some notation at this stage. The objects for which we de￿ne notation
here are equilibrium quantities, and thus will derive economic meaning only in our formal
analysis below.
We de￿ne the following:




0 if a = 0
1 if a = 1;
(1)
which represents the manager￿ s strategy: he takes an action after having observed the reali-
sation of ~ ￿.
10While we treat contracts as exogenous at present, it is worth noting that all that we need for our core
results (Propositions 1 and 3 below) is the existence of a class of funds for whom ￿ = 0 and w > 0. The
existence of such a class of funds is essentially guaranteed by the regulatory framework in the United States.
The Investment Companies Act of 1940 features a clause often referred to as the ￿fulcrum fee rule￿ which
requires that mutual fund￿ s performance fees are symmetric in gains and losses. As a result, the vast majority
of US mutual funds charges fees that are uncontingent (see, for example, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003)).
11It would be possible, without changing the qualitative results, to replace this liquidity shock by some
other form of ine¢ ciency (e.g., noise traders) in the interim date market. In this case, the fund would still be
able to ￿hide￿behind the noise when trading at t = 1, while investors upon seeing a sale by their fund would
still know that the fund chose to exit.
12Since the investor infers the fund￿ s action from the value of the portfolio he observes at
t = 1, we write the investor￿ s information set to include aF 2 fs;nsg and we de￿ne
Es := E
￿
~ a~ ￿j aF = s
￿
(2)
as the ex ante expected change in ￿rm￿ s value when the investor observes the fund selling the
shares (aF = s) and
Ens := E
￿
~ a~ ￿j aF = ns
￿
(3)
the ex ante expected change in ￿rm￿ s value when he observes the fund not selling (aF = ns),
where aF 2 fs;nsg.
At t = 1 the investor updates his expectation of his continuation payo⁄ (for period 2+)





where aF 2 fs;nsg and which will depend on equilibrium quantities and will be computed
in each relevant section. If the investor ￿res the fund at t = 1 he is randomly matched to a
new fund and his continuation payo⁄ is
￿ ￿I := E(~ ￿I) = ￿F￿I
g + (1 ￿ ￿F)￿I
b: (5)
We denote by aI 2 ff;rg the action of the investor at time 1 where he either ￿res (f) or
retains (r) the fund.
Finally, denote the collection of deep model parameters with the exception of ￿;w;￿I
g and
￿I







5 The Failure of Governance via Exit
We show that, with delegated blockholding, exit may no longer act as an e⁄ective disciplining
device. In particular, we ask: Is it feasible for delegated blockholders to credibly threaten
managers with exit conditional on a perverse action being taken? We answer this question
as follows:
Proposition 1 For ￿
w small enough and for ￿I
g ￿￿I
b large enough, there is never an equilib-
rium in which any type of fund sells if and only if she observes a = 1:
In other words, this proposition highlights two conditions under which the bene￿cial e⁄ect
of the threat of exit identi￿ed by Admati and P￿ eiderer does not survive when the blockholder
is an agent. First, the blockholder must be principally motivated by ￿ ows rather than by
13pro￿ts. Second, investors must be su¢ ciently interested in retaining only good funds, which
in turn generates career concerns for delegated blockholders.
Our argument will proceed as follows. We ￿rst establish conditions under which, if the
fund adopts a strategy of selling the block at t = 1 if and only if she observes that the
manager has taken the perverse action, then the investor chooses to retain the fund if and
only if the fund has not sold at t = 1. We then establish conditions under which, such a
retention strategy on the part of the investor induces the fund not to sell at t = 1 even if
she has observed the manager taking the perverse action. This, then, establishes a set of
conditions under which it is impossible for the fund to sell (in equilibrium) at t = 1 if and
only if she observes the perverse action. We ￿rst establish the formal proof and then provide
an intuitive discussion of the ingredients delivering our main result.





ns if a = 0
s if a = 1:
(6)
We ￿rst outline the manager￿ s best response to the fund￿ s behaviour.
To determine the manager￿ s strategy we compare his expected utility from taking the
perverse action with that from not taking the perverse action, once he observes the realization
of ~ ￿ at t = 0.
If he takes the perverse action, he knows that the fund will sell his shares at t = 1 so
P1 = v ￿ Es and P2 = v ￿ ￿. Thus his expected utility is
￿ + !1P1 + !2P2 = ￿ + !1(v ￿ Es) + !2(v ￿ ￿): (7)
If he does not take the perverse action, he knows that the fund will sell his shares at t = 1 only
for liquidity reasons￿ which occurs with probability ￿￿ and that P2 = v. Thus his expected
utility is
!1P1 + !2P2 = !1fv ￿ ￿Es ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Ensg + !2v: (8)





1 if ￿ ￿ !1(1 ￿ ￿)(Es ￿ Ens) ￿ !2￿ ￿ 0
0 otherwise.
(9)
Since ￿ ￿ !1(1 ￿ ￿)(Es ￿ Ens) ￿ !2￿ is decreasing in ￿, the manager￿ s best response will
be characterised by a cuto⁄ point ￿sep, such that the he takes the perverse action for any
￿ ￿ ￿sep, where the cuto⁄ is equal to the ￿xed point of the following equation:
￿sep =
￿ ￿ !1(1 ￿ ￿)(Es(￿sep) ￿ Ens(￿sep))
!2
: (10)





1 if ￿ ￿ ￿sep
0 otherwise.
(11)
The cuto⁄ point ￿sep is unique if Es(￿sep) ￿ Ens(￿sep) is increasing in ￿sep: To establish this,
we compute Es and Ens as functions of ￿sep.
When the fund sells her shares, the market does not know whether it is for liquidity or
speculative reasons and hence
Es(￿sep) =
(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
: (12)
Computations for equations (12) are shown in the appendix.
If the fund does not sell, the market infers that the manager has not taken the perverse
action and that the value of the ￿rm is v. Hence,
Ens(￿sep) = 0: (13)
It is now easy to see that Es(￿sep)￿Ens(￿sep) is increasing in ￿sep establishing the unique-
ness of ￿sep. The proof of this result is detailed in the appendix. We now proceed to compute
the best response of the patient investor￿ the investor who at t = 1 has not been hit by a
liquidity shock and has not liquidated his position.
The investor￿ s decision at t = 1 relies on what inference he expects to make at t = 2. At
t = 2, there are three mutually exclusive and exhaustive events:
E1 = f￿ ￿ ￿sepg \ fa = 0g (14)
E2 = f￿ > ￿sepg \ fa = 0g (15)
E3 = fa = 1g (16)
The investor also infers the action of the fund from the portfolio value. Thus, the investor￿ s
t = 2 information set consists of six possible paired events, which are the elements of
fE1;E2;E3g ￿ fs;nsg:
Each of these events conveys di⁄erent information to the investor and may a⁄ect his retention
vs ￿ring decision at t = 2. We ￿rst consider the events that can arise on the putative












. For each of
these cases, the investor can compute the probability that he is matched with a good fund
15using Bayes Rule as follows:
P(￿F = gjE1;aF = ns) =
￿F
￿F + (1 ￿ ￿F)￿M
> ￿F (17)
P(￿F = gjE2;aF = ns) = ￿F; (18)
P(￿F = gjE3;aF = s) = 0: (19)

























￿ it is impossible to assign posteriors based on Bayes Rule,
and, since we are proving an impossibility result, we make no assumption whatsoever on the
investor￿ s behaviour in these cases. It is easy to see that our arguments below will be unaf-
fected by the speci￿c posterior chosen by the investor under these o⁄-(putative)-equilibrium
events.12
Having thus computed the investor￿ s decision rule at t = 2, we proceed to compute his
strategy at t = 1. In order to make his t = 1 decision, he ￿rst observes the fund￿ s portfolio
and infers her action, then computes the probability of ending up in one of the three events
conditional on the action he observes. Finally, he computes his continuation payo⁄ in each
event conditional on his retention vs ￿ring decision at t = 2 as speci￿ed above.







P(E2jaF = ns); and P(E3
￿









~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep
￿
(￿F + (1 ￿ ￿F)￿M )
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M )P
￿
~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep
￿ (20)
P(E2jaF = ns) =
1 ￿ P
￿
~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M )P
￿




￿aF = ns) = 0: (22)
In this putative equilibrium if the investor observes the fund not selling, it must be that the
manager has taken action a = 0, hence E3 will never realise. We have already shown above
that, conditional on events E1 and E2; the investor will choose to retain at t = 2. Thus, if
the investor observes aF = ns and retains the fund at t = 1, his expected payo⁄ is:
(1 ￿ ￿)E
￿
P2 j aF = ns
￿
￿ 2w + E
￿
~ ￿I j aF = ns
￿
;
12In particular, since the investor assigns probability zero at t = 1 to each of these continuation events, his
t = 1 decision (which is what determines the behaviour of the fund) is una⁄ected by any assumptions about













P(￿F = gjE1;aF = ns)￿I
g + (1 ￿ P(￿F = gjE1;aF = ns))￿I
b
￿
+ P(E2jaF = ns)
￿
P(￿F = gjE2;aF = ns)￿I




Simplifying, we have that if the investor observes aF = ns and retains the fund at t = 1, his
expected payo⁄ is:
(1 ￿ ￿)v ￿ 2w + ￿ ￿I +
P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)￿F(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)




Instead, if the investor observes aF = ns and ￿res the fund, his expected payo⁄ is:





= (1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ Es(￿sep)) ￿ w + ￿ ￿I; (25)
because he gets his share of the liquidating portfolio, he pays the ￿xed wage and receives the
unconditional expected continuation payo⁄ by being randomly matched to a fund at t = 2.
Hence, the investor will choose to retain the fund conditional on no sale if
(1 ￿ ￿)v ￿ 2w + ￿ ￿I +
P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)￿F(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)




(1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ Es(￿sep)) ￿ w + ￿ ￿I (26)
i.e.
(1 ￿ ￿)Es(￿sep) +
P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)￿F(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿E)
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)
(￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b) ￿ w (27)
It is clear that, for a given f￿;w;￿g, as long as ￿I
g ￿￿I
b is large enough, equation (27) holds.
It is also clear that the lower bound on ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b is increasing in ￿, since Es(￿sep) > 0. Let us
denote the relevant lower bound on ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b as a function of ￿ by B￿￿ (￿;w;￿).
If, instead, the investor observes that the fund sold at t = 1, if he ￿res the fund he gets:
(1 ￿ ￿)P1 ￿ w + E(~ ￿I) = (1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ Es(￿sep)) ￿ w + ￿ ￿I: (28)
















P(E3jaF = s) = 1; (31)
17and we have already shown that
P(￿F = gjE3;aF = s) = 0:
He knows, therefore, that in the only potential event that can arise at t = 2, he will wish to
replace the fund. Thus, his expected payo⁄ from retention is:
(1 ￿ ￿)P1 ￿ 2w + ￿ ￿I = (1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ Es(￿sep)) ￿ 2w + ￿ ￿I: (32)
Thus, it is clear that the investor will ￿re at t = 1 if he observes a sale.
Thus, as long as ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b is large enough, the investor retains the fund if and only if she
chose not to sell at t = 1. We now show that, when ￿ is small, the investor￿ s behaviour leads
the fund to deviate from her proposed equilibrium strategy.
Suppose the fund observes a = 0. If she chooses to hold, she is retained by the investor
and thus gets
2w + ￿E(P2 j a = 0) + P(retained in t = 2)￿F = 2w + ￿v + ￿F:
If she chooses to sell she instead gets
w + ￿P1 = w + ￿(v ￿ Es(￿sep)):
It is clear that she will always choose to hold.
Suppose the fund observes a = 1. If she sells, given the investor￿ s strategy above, she is
￿red and receives
w + ￿P1 = w + ￿(v ￿ Es(￿sep)):
If, instead, she chooses not to sell she will be retained at t = 1, but may or may not be ￿red
at t = 2, depending on the investor￿ s beliefs at the time. Upon observing a = 1, the fund
realizes that the investor will observe event (E3;ns) at t = 2. As noted above, we are agnostic
about the investor￿ s beliefs upon observing such o⁄-equilibrium events. Thus, the argument
here must hold for all possible beliefs P(￿F =gjE3;aF = ns). From the fund￿ s perspective,
the lowest possible payo⁄ from not selling arises if the investor ￿res for sure (which arises if
P(￿F = gjE3;aF = ns) < ￿F). For all other possible o⁄-equilibrium beliefs, the fund must
assign at least positive probability to receiving, in addition to the payo⁄s at t = 1 and t = 2,
a continuation payo⁄ of ￿F > 0 at t = 2+. Thus, a upper bound on the fund￿ s payo⁄ from
not selling is:
2w + E(P2ja = 1) = 2w + ￿
￿
v ￿ E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
￿
:





ns if a = 0
s if a = 1;
(33)
18is that
w + ￿(v ￿ Es(￿sep)) ￿ 2w + ￿
￿
v ￿ E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
￿
; (34)
which we can rewrite as:
E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
"
1 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)






It is clear that ￿xing ￿, as w
￿ increases, inequality (35) is harder to satisfy. Let￿ s de￿ne
B ￿
w (￿) as the smallest ￿
w satisfying inequality (35). De￿ne ￿(w;￿) = w
B ￿
w (￿) as the lowest







b > B￿￿ (￿(w;￿);w;￿):
Since B￿￿ (￿(w;￿);w;￿) is increasing in ￿, for ￿ and ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b satisfying (i) and (ii) it
is clear that inequality (27) holds and (35) does not, giving a contradiction. This concludes
the formal argument.￿
We now proceed to discuss the intuition behind our result.
For exit to impose discipline, funds must sell in equilibrium if they observe the perverse
action being taken. We show that the career concerns of funds￿ their desire to be retained
by clients￿ endogenously prevent them from acting in this manner. Since good funds can
eliminate the perverse action without the need to exit, the only funds that can be seen to
exit must be the bad ones. But then exit reveals that the fund is of the bad type, which
will induce the investor to ￿re the fund￿ keeping a fund on an extra period is expensive to
investors because in each period that they do so, they pay an uncontingent assets-under-
management fee w for employing the fund. When observing the perverse action being taken,
the bad fund therefore faces the choice between two options: She may either hold the block,
be retained by the investor and earn w for an extra period, but su⁄er from an ￿￿share of
smaller pro￿ts at t = 2 or she may sell the block early, be ￿red by the investor and lose the
assets-under-management fee for the second period, but realize larger pro￿ts on the actual
position. When w is large and ￿ is small, the former option is more attractive. This is the
￿rst of two conditions identi￿ed in Proposition 1.
However, notice that for the argument above to be valid, it is not just necessary for the
investor to ￿re the fund conditional on an early block sale, but also to retain the fund in
the absence of such a sale. Why would the investor choose to pay w for an extra period
when the fund cannot take any further productive actions on his behalf during t = 2? He
would do so because by retaining the fund, he gathers further information about her type.
19Since in the continuation game the investor would rather be matched with a good than a
bad fund, this additional information about the type is valuable to the investor. Indeed, it is
most valuable￿ and worth paying w for an extra period￿ precisely when good and bad funds
produce signi￿cantly di⁄erent continuation values for the investor, i.e., when ￿I
g ￿￿I
b is large
enough. This is the second condition identi￿ed in Proposition 1.
It is also worth commenting on the applied relevance of these two conditions. The second
condition (a lower bound on ￿I
g ￿￿I
b) identi￿es circumstances under which investors endoge-
nously retain funds if and only if they have not sold at t = 1. When funds sell at t = 1 their
portfolio value is lower than it would have been at t = 1 had they not sold. Thus, the second
condition guarantees that investors retain funds with relatively high t = 1 portfolio values
and replace those with low t = 1 portfolio values. In other words, investors chase short-term
performance. Short-term performance chasing by investors appears to be a robust feature of
the data, and holds across very di⁄erent classes of delegated portfolio managers. For exam-
ple, ￿ ow performance relationships have been identi￿ed both for mutual funds (e.g. Chevalier
and Ellison (1997)) and for hedge funds (e.g. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009)). In contrast,
the ￿rst condition (a lower bound on ￿
w) separates di⁄erent types of funds. For example, at
one end of the spectrum, US mutual funds receive typically purely uncontingent fees.13 In
contrast, at the other end of the spectrum, hedge funds receive a signi￿cant component of
their compensation from contingent fees explicitly linked to portfolio value.
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, it is worth noting that while the two conditions in
Proposition 1 are jointly su¢ cient for our result￿ absent restrictions on the set of parameters
(￿;w;￿)￿ they are individually necessary. It is clear that, if ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b is large enough to
guarantee that investors will retain the fund if and only if she does not sell but ￿ is large
relative to w, the fund will still prefer (despite the presence of career concerns) to sell upon
observing a = 1. Similarly, even if ￿ was su¢ ciently small relative to w, if ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b is small,
then￿ depending on the parameters (￿;w;￿)￿ it is possible that the fund would always be
replaced at t = 1, and therefore may as well maximize portfolio value which is achieved by
selling early whenever a = 1.
To conclude this section, we provide a variation of our main result. We have shown
that su¢ cient career concerns on the part of delegated blockholders precludes the existence
of equilibria in which blockholders can punish funds non-stochastically when they take the
perverse action. The careful reader may wonder if it is possible, despite the career concerns of
delegated blockholders, to have equilibria in which, if the manager takes the perverse action,
the delegated blockholder punishes him with arbitrarily high probability ￿ < 1. While threats
involving mixed strategies are, in our view, of limited applied relevance, we nevertheless show
13 Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003) note that over 97% of US mutual funds charge purely ￿ at fees.
20that even such stochastic punishment fails in the presence of su¢ cient career concerns. In
particular, we show that:
Proposition 2 There exists ^ ￿ 2 (0;1) such that for any ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ there are bounds B￿￿ (￿)
and B ￿
w (￿) such that if ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b > B￿￿ (￿) and ￿
w < B ￿
w (￿), it cannot be an equilibrium for
the fund to choose to sell with probability ￿ if and only if she observes a = 1 because, upon
observing a = 1; the fund will strictly prefer not to sell.
This and all subsequent proofs are provided in the appendix. Taken together, Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 show that exit cannot act as an e⁄ective disciplining device when delegated
blockholders are principally concerned about retention. Needless to say, while Propositions 1
and 2 establish impossibility results, in order to have empirical content, we need to delineate
what happens in equilibrium. In the next section, we address this question.
6 Who Exits in Equilibrium and Who Does Not
In this section, we construct equilibria with minimal and maximal amounts of exit. We begin
with the case of minimal exit. For an important class of institutional investors, our result
shows that exit can be an entirely ine⁄ective disciplining device in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For ￿
w small enough and ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b large enough, there is an equilibrium in
which
(i) The patient investor ￿res a fund if she sells at t = 1 and retains her otherwise;
(ii) No fund sells at t = 1 regardless of the action chosen by the manager.
The proposition identi￿es two conditions under which there is an equilibrium with no exit.
The conditions are qualitatively similar to those of Proposition 1. First, the fund must be
su¢ ciently more interested in ￿ ows than in pro￿ts. Second, the investor must care su¢ ciently
more about being matched with a good than a bad fund. A voluntary sale at t = 1 is an
o⁄-equilibrium event which leads to the replacement of the fund. In contrast, the lack of a
voluntary sale leads to retention, because by retaining the fund the investor gains further
information about her type￿ which is most valuable exactly when ￿I
g ￿￿I
b is high. Since the
investor is willing to pay w for an extra period if the fund does not sell at t = 1; a su¢ ciently
￿ ow motivated fund does not sell even upon observing the perverse action because she is
willing to sacri￿ce pro￿ts for ￿ ows.
We then move on to consider the polar opposite case, where exit occurs whenever the
manager takes the perverse action. Needless to say, exit cannot arise in equilibrium if both
the conditions identi￿ed in Proposition 1 are satis￿ed. However, as we have noted above, the
21two conditions are jointly su¢ cient but are individually necessary. Thus, there is a degree
of freedom in relaxing these conditions in order to construct equilibria with exit. Since
our main applied motivation in this section is to theoretically delineate the prevalence of
exit across di⁄erent classes of delegated portfolio managers, we feel that it is appropriate to
motivate our choice on the basis of what is ex ante empirically plausible. Given the empirical
relevance of short-term performance chasing by investors across di⁄erent types of delegated
portfolio managers (see the discussion in section 5), we therefore maintain the assumption
that guarantees that investors retain only those funds who have performed relatively better
in the recent past. Fixing this assumption, we show that, if ￿
w is large, exit can function
e⁄ectively as a disciplining device. In particular, we show that:
Proposition 4 For ￿
w and ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b large enough, there is an equilibrium in which
(i) The patient investor ￿res a fund if she sells at t = 1 and retains her otherwise.
(ii) The fund sells at t = 1 whenever the manager chooses a = 1.
Propositions 3 and 4 generate clear empirical implications. In Proposition 3, we have
shown that for ￿
w small enough, a delegated blockholder will never be e⁄ective in using exit
to discipline management. In Proposition 4, we have show that for ￿
w large enough, there will
be equilibria in which delegated blockholders can credibly threaten management with exit.
Thus, the e⁄ectiveness of exit as a governance mechanism will be determined by variations
in the contractual incentives of the delegated blockholder.14
Across the di⁄erent classes of delegated portfolio managers, there is clear variation in the
size of ￿
w. As mentioned above, mutual funds typically receive no explicit pro￿t-based com-
pensation. Thus, the vast majority of mutual funds have ￿
w = 0. Other portfolio managers,
such as hedge funds, for example, derive a signi￿cant fraction of their payo⁄s from explicit
pro￿t-based compensation. For these investment vehicles, ￿
w >> 0. Thus, our results taken
together suggest that mutual funds would be less e⁄ective in using exit as a disciplining de-
vice than hedge funds. This is a testable implication of our model. While we are aware of no
direct empirical examination of this prediction, as we have pointed out in the introduction,
this result is broadly consistent with an existing body of empirical evidence.
14A critique of our results may argue that variation in the contractual parameters is not necessarily relevant




b is small, then even low
￿
w funds (i.e., mutual funds) will use exit. However, we




b is small for low
￿
w funds, i.e., for mutual funds, which implies
that mutual fund investors do not chase performance. This is highly counterfactual, as there is a wealth of
empirical evidence to the contrary.
227 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some of our modelling assumptions and conclusions. We begin by
discussing the nature of the inferences made by investors who observe early liquidation of
blocks by their funds.
7.1 Could exit be a good signal of managerial ability?
Our core observation (Proposition 1) relies on the fact that investors who observe that their
fund sold conclude that she will not generate high returns for them in the future. This is
because the need to execute on a threat to exit implies that this fund was unable to prevent
management from acting perversely (or perhaps chose the wrong ￿rm to hold a block in, see
footnote 7). Needless to say, implicit in this conclusion is a modelling choice: observable
evidence of governance via exit is a negative signal, because fund managers who hold blocks
are distinguished by their ability to in￿ uence management (or by their ability to select the
right set of ￿rms to hold blocks in). While this assumption seems more natural to us in
a corporate governance context, it is conceivable to construct alternative models in which
delegated blockholders￿ while being identical in other ways￿ di⁄er only in their ability to
observe the actions of management in ￿rms in which they hold blocks. In such models, it is
possible for exit to be a positive signal, because it signals to investors that the exiting fund
knows that management is acting suboptimally. Are our results robust to such a modi￿cation?
We would argue that￿ as in our baseline model￿ the career concerns of delegated block-
holders would again interfere with the ability of exit to e⁄ectively discipline management. If
exit is a good signal of ability, career concerned blockholders would exit excessively, i.e., they
would exit not because the manager had taken a perverse action but because they wished to
attract or retain ￿ ows. Any incentive mechanism that breaks the precise link between the
action choice of the manager and the exit of the blockholder would make exit less e⁄ective as
a form of voice. To formalize this intuition, we develop a simple model in the appendix (see
section 8.1) in which funds are distinguished by the quality of their information about the
internal working of ￿rms in which they hold blocks. Firms are heterogeneous in the degree to
which they su⁄er from agency problems, with di⁄erences arising from the extent of private
bene￿ts that the management can extract by e⁄ort avoidance. We show that when block-
holders are career concerned, excessive exit will arise￿ and thus limit the disciplinary ability
of exit￿ exactly for those ￿rms in which the moral hazard problem is most severe. It is for
these ￿rms that exit will endogenously be viewed as a positive signal of ability on the part
of the delegated blockholder. Consequently, for these ￿rms, a career concerned blockholder
will exit too often, breaking the link between managerial misbehaviour and punishment by
23blockholders.
While the core economic content of our results are thus robust to this alternative formu-
lation of managerial ability, we should note that the two alterantive models of exit di⁄er in
their empirical plausibility. If exit was viewed as a positive signal about ability (as in the
alternative formulation), then exit should be associated with in￿ ows (or the lack of exit with
out￿ ows). Since exit lowers share prices, and thus indirectly the portfolio value of the fund
(the sale of a block is likely to have a ￿rst-order e⁄ect on the value of even a large fund),
the alternative model would require investor ￿ ows to be negatively related to performance at
least over some range. This is highly counterfactual. The empirical literature presents per-
suasive evidence for the existence of an increasing ￿ ow-performance relationship. In contrast
to the alternative, our baseline mechanism is consistent with an increasing ￿ ow-performance
relationship. Indeed, such a ￿ ow performance relationship is (endogenously) instrumental in
our baseline model: It is exactly when investors observe low performance at t = 1 that they
￿re the fund (i.e., withdraw their funds).
7.2 Non-linear compensation for money managers
In our baseline analysis we have assumed that, in addition to the essentially universal uncon-
tingent assets under management fee, the fund receives an ￿-share of realized portfolio value.
In reality, funds often receive compensation that takes the form of a ￿2 and 20￿contract: a
2% uncontingent assets under management fee plus 20% of realized pro￿ts (i.e., max(pro￿ts,
0)). It is worth noting that our core results would not change if we introduced such non-linear
payo⁄s for funds.
Our results only rely on the relative value of the portfolio values from early vs late
liquidation if the manager took the perverse action. At no stage does our analysis require
that the explicit compensation of the fund be negative. Thus, conditional on a = 1, if
pE represents the portfolio value from early liquidation, and pL represents the portfolio
value from late liquidation, our analysis uses only the fact that pE > pL. Suppose the
block was initially established at some (unmodelled) price p0. Then pE > pL implies that
max(pE ￿ p0;0) ￿ max(pL ￿ p0;0), with strict inequality unless p0 ￿ pE > pL. Except
in this perverse latter case, our qualitative analysis remains unchanged: the fund￿ s career
concerns push her in the direction of not exiting, while her pro￿t motivations push her to do
the opposite. Thus, more career concerned funds will not exit, while less career concerned
funds will. In the perverse case in which p0 ￿ pE > pL, pro￿t motivations no longer a⁄ect
the choice to exit, and the only remaining motivation remains the fund￿ s career concerns. In
this case, no fund would choose to exit, regardless of the relative sizes of ￿ and w.
247.3 Is delegation rational?
The empirical relevance of Proposition 3 is predicated on the existence of investors who would
choose to invest in delegated funds with low ￿ and high w in spite of their inability to use
exit as a disciplining mechanism. There are two separate components to this question. First,
since funds with high ￿ and low w (e.g. hedge funds) generate higher value through exit
than funds with low ￿ and high w, it is clear that investors would prefer to invest in hedge
funds rather than in mutual funds. It is clear that there are a variety of frictions that lead
to the segmentation of markets with regard to delegated portfolio management. Investment
in hedge funds requires, for example, that the investors pass signi￿cant net-worth thresholds
which make hedge funds inaccessible for large groups of retail investors. However, despite
the evident existence of such a class of investors, it is also also relevant to ask whether those
investors who can only access mutual funds would prefer to do so (despite the payment of
fees and the perverse behaviour identi￿ed in Proposition 3) rather than invest in the storage
asset.15 To answer this question we compute the ex ante expected utility for the investor at
time 0:
UI(￿pool) = (1 ￿ ￿)[v ￿ ￿Es(￿pool) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Ens(￿pool)] ￿ w(2 ￿ ￿)
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿





The ￿rst term refers to the investors share of the liquidated portfolio value, the second term
refers to the payment of the uncontingent fee, and the ￿nal term arises from the additional
value obtained by each investor from learning about the fund from delegation. We can rewrite
this as follows:
UI(￿pool) = (1 ￿ ￿)
h
v ￿ (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool)E(~ ￿
￿ ￿ ~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool)
i
￿ w(2 ￿ ￿)
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿







b) to satisfy the conditions of Proposition 3, it is clear that if v is large
enough this inequality is satis￿ed.16
15One could think of the storage asset as some benchmark portfolio, so that the returns from investing in
active management with blockholding are viewed as being relative to such an alternative.
16An alternative comparison that we could have done is the delegation with pooling vs non-delegated
blockholding by a coalition of investors. Here too, since good funds can eliminate the perverse action with
probability one and bad funds only with some positive probability there will be conditions that guarantee the
optimality of delegation. However, we would argue that this condition is not economically meaningful as small
investors do not meaningfully have the ability to participate directly in blockholding.
258 Conclusions
Blockholders are often seen as a solution to the problems arising from the separation of
ownership and control in publicly traded corporation. In order for the various elements
of blockholder activism to be successful, it may be helpful for blockholders to be able to
credibly threaten management by exit. Admati and P￿ eiderer (2009) show that the threat
of exit can be an e⁄ective form of corporate governance when the blockholder is a pro￿t-
maximizing principal. Motivated by the prevalence of equity blocks that are held by delegated
portfolio managers, we analyze whether agency frictions arising out of delegated portfolio
management￿ career concerns￿ may a⁄ect the ability of blockholders to govern through exit.
We show that when blockholders are su¢ ciently career concerned, exit will fail as a disci-
plining device. Our results have testable implications on the relative degree to which di⁄erent
classes of delegated portfolio managers use exit as a form governance. We relate our results
to the existing empirical literature on corporate governance by institutional blockholders and
argue that there is both direct and indirect empirical evidence in support of our ￿ndings.
Our analysis examines the interplay of two distinct agency problems: between the man-
agers and equity holders of ￿rms on the one hand, and between delegating investors and
their portfolio managers on the other. Both of these problems are ubiquitous. Our results
suggest that the two agency problems interact in crucial ways: the existence of the latter may
undermine traditional solutions to the former. Needless to say, our analysis represents only
a benchmark ￿rst step, and much remains to be done. It may be interesting, for example,
to examine how the career concerns of delegated portfolio managers interact with Edmans￿ s
(2009) elegant formulation for governance via exit. Edmans shows how blockholder trading
can impound information into prices giving rise to better governance. In a di⁄erent con-
text, Dasgupta and Prat (2006, 2008) have examined the link between the career concerns of
money managers and the price-informativeness of assets they trade. The exploration of such
interactions is an interesting direction for future research.
Appendix




~ a~ ￿j aF = s
￿
= Es(￿sep) =
(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
; (37)
where




0 if a = 0
1 if a = 1:
(38)
26We call ~ e 2 fe;neg a random variable that is equal to e if the fund costlessly eliminates the
manager￿ s perverse action, for example through voice, whereas it is equal to ne when the
perverse action is not eliminated and the fund has only access to exit as a disciplining device.
We also introduce another random variable ~ l = fls;nlsg that indicates whether the fund has
been hit by a liquidity shock.
Let￿ s ￿x the strategy of the fund: she sells if she observes the perverse action or if she
is hit by a liquidity shock, and does not sell otherwise. Recall that only the bad fund can






s if a = 1 and ￿F = b or if ~ l = ls;
ns otherwise:
(39)
The manager￿ s strategy, which is a best response to the fund￿ s strategy, is






















































1f~ ￿￿￿sepg1f￿F =bg1f~ e=neg~ ￿
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Given independence, we have that
E
￿




















￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
=
(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
:
27Proof of the uniqueness of the manager￿ s cuto⁄ in the putative disciplining equi-
lbrium: If ￿sep < ￿ ￿ is a cuto⁄, then ￿ ￿ !1(1 ￿ ￿)(Es(￿sep) ￿ Ens(￿sep)) ￿ !2￿sep = 0 where
Es(￿sep) =
(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
(41)
and
Ens(￿sep) = 0: (42)
The cuto⁄ will be unique if Es(￿sep)￿Ens(￿sep) is increasing in ￿sep ; this di⁄erence is simply
equal to Es(￿sep) which it is easy to see that is increasing in ￿sep. In fact,
Es(￿sep) ￿ Ens(￿sep) = Es(￿sep) =
(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)
￿
P(~ ￿￿￿sep) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)
; (43)
is increasing in ￿sep since both E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep) and P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep) are increasing in ￿sep.
Proof of Proposition 2: The structure of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. We
sketch the proof here, highlighting only the points of departure from that argument. Consider
any putative equilibrium in which the fund￿ s strategy is to sell with probability ￿ if a = 1
and not to sell otherwise. The manager￿ s expected utility from a = 0 remains unchanged (see
8) whereas his utility from a = 1 changes from (7) to
￿ + !1 fv ￿ ￿Es ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[￿Es + (1 ￿ ￿)Ens]g + !2(v ￿ ￿): (44)
As before the manager￿ s strategy will be characterized by a threshold ￿￿ which is now im-
plicitly de￿ned by:
￿￿ =





(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)




(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)
: (47)
The threshold ￿￿ is uniquely de￿ned as long as Es(￿￿) ￿ Ens(￿￿) is increasing in ￿￿. This is
true as long as ￿ is not too small as the following lemma shows:
Lemma 5 There exists a ^ ￿ 2 (0;1) such that for ￿ ￿ ^ ￿, Es(￿￿) ￿ Ens(￿￿) is increasing in
￿￿.
28Proof of Lemma: Let A = (1￿￿F)(1￿￿M), E (￿￿) = E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿), and P (￿￿) = P(~ ￿ ￿
￿￿). Note that E and P are both increasing functions of ￿￿. Then,
Es(￿￿) =
AE (￿￿)(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)
￿
P(￿￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)A
;









+ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)A
￿






which is clearly bounded below by a strictly positive number for all ￿. In addition,
Ens(￿￿) =





















This implies that @
@￿￿Ens(￿￿) converges continuously to 0 as ￿ ! 1. Thus, there exists a
^ ￿ 2 (0;1) such that for ￿ ￿ ^ ￿, Es(￿￿)￿Ens(￿￿) is increasing in ￿￿. This concludes the proof
of the lemma. ￿
Consider ￿rst the best response of the patient investor at t = 2. De￿ne the events E1,
E2, and E3 as before, so that at t = 2 the investor observes elements of the cross product
















can arise in equilibrium, and the posterior
attached at t = 2 for each of these events is as follows:
P(￿F = gjE1;aF = ns) =
￿F
￿F + (1 ￿ ￿F)￿M
> ￿F (48)
P(￿F = gjE2;aF = ns) = ￿F; (49)
P(￿F = gjE3;aF = ns) = 0 (50)
P(￿F = gjE3;aF = s) = 0: (51)
This implies that the investor retains at t = 2 in the ￿rst two events and replaces at t = 2 in
the last two events. As before, we make no assumption about the investor￿ s behaviour in the
other two events.









~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿
(￿F + (1 ￿ ￿F)￿M )
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M )P
￿




P(E2jaF = ns) =
1 ￿ P
￿
~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M )P
￿






￿aF = ns) =
(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)(1 ￿ ￿)P
￿
~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M )P
￿




Thus, if the investor observes aF = ns and retains the fund at t = 1, his expected payo⁄ can
be written as:
(1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ Ens(￿￿)) ￿ 2w + ￿ ￿I +
P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿F(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)




Instead, if the investor observes aF = ns and ￿res the fund, his expected payo⁄ is:





= (1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ Es(￿￿)) ￿ w + ￿ ￿I: (56)
Hence, the investor will choose to retain the fund conditional on no sale if
(1 ￿ ￿)(Es(￿￿) ￿ Ens(￿￿)) +
P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿F(1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿
(￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b) ￿ w (57)
It is clear that, for a given ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ and f￿;w;￿g, as long as ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b is large enough,
equation (57) holds. It is also clear that the lower bound on ￿I
g ￿￿I
b is increasing in ￿, since
Es(￿￿) ￿ Ens(￿￿) > 0. Let us denote the relevant lower bound on ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b by B￿￿(￿).
If the investor observes a sale at t = 1, an argument identical to that in Proposition 1
estabishes that it is optimal for him to ￿re the fund immediately.
Finally, we turn to the fund￿ s best response. The case for when a fund observes a = 0 is
identical to that in Proposition 1. When the fund observes a = 1;in the putative equilibrium
with ￿ 2 (0;1) she must be indi⁄erent between selling and not selling at t = 1. If she sells
her expected payo⁄ is:
￿P1 + w = ￿(v ￿ Es(￿￿)) + w (58)
whereas if she does not sell and condition (57) holds then she is retained at t = 1 and gets:
￿(v ￿ E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)) + 2w (59)
Therefore, it must be the case that
￿(v ￿ Es(￿￿)) + w = ￿(v ￿ E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)) + 2w; (60)
30i.e.




1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)
￿






It is clear that ￿xing ￿ and ￿ ￿ ^ ￿, we can ￿nd a ￿
w that satis￿es equation (61). Let￿ s de￿ne
B ￿
w(￿) as the ￿





w < B ￿
w(￿).
Since B￿￿(￿) is increasing in ￿, for ￿ and ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b satisfying (i) and (ii) it is clear that
inequality (57) holds and (61) does not, giving a contradiction.17￿
Proof of Proposition 3: We construct a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the action
of the bad fund who observes the perverse action is the same as the action of the fund who
observes the non-perverse action.
We denote the equilibrium by a triplet (sM;sF;sI) of strategies for the three sets of players.
Let￿ s start with the manager￿ s strategy. The manager￿ s expected utility if he chooses
a = 1 is
￿ + !1 [v ￿ ￿Es ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Ens] + !2(v ￿ ￿): (62)
This is because he knows that at time 1 the fund is going to sell only if the investor is hit
by a liquidity shock (which happens with probability ￿). Similarly, the manager￿ s expected
utility if a = 0 is
!1 [v ￿ ￿Es ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Ens] + !2v; (63)





1 if ￿ ￿ !2￿ ￿ 0
0 otherwise.
(64)
Since ￿ ￿ !2￿ ￿ 0 is decreasing in ￿ if the manager prefers to take the perverse action for a
given ￿, he must strictly prefer to take action for all smaller values. An equilibrium is then
characterised by a cuto⁄ point ￿pool, such that the manager takes action for any ￿ ￿ ￿pool.





17It is, of course, possible to violate equality (61) by picking
￿
w > B ￿
w (￿). However, in this case ￿ = 1,
because the fund strictly prefers selling to not selling. This case has been dealt with already in Proposition 1.
31and is unique. Now, we can compute Es and Ens as functions of ￿pool as follows (we show
detailed computations separately later in the appendix):
Es(￿pool) = Ens(￿pool) = (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool): (66)
We now proceed to compute the strategy of the patient investor.
The investor￿ s decision at t = 1 relies on what inference he expects to make at t = 2. At
t = 2 the investor will observe one of the following three mutually exclusive and exhaustive
events:
E1 = f￿ ￿ ￿poolg \ fa = 0g (67)
E2 = f￿ > ￿poolg \ fa = 0g (68)
E3 = fa = 1g (69)
In addition, the investor will have observed either aF = s or aF = ns at t = 1. Thus, the
investor￿ s information set consists of six possible paired events, which are the elements of
fE1;E2;E3g ￿ fs;nsg:
Each of these events conveys di⁄erent information to the investor and may a⁄ect his retention
vs ￿ring decision at t = 2. We ￿rst consider the events that can arise on the putative












. For each of
these cases, the investor can compute the probability that he is matched with a good fund
using Bayes Rule as follows:
P(￿F = gjE1;aF = ns) =
￿F
￿F + (1 ￿ ￿F)￿M
> ￿F (70)
P(￿F = gjE2;aF = ns) = ￿F (71)
P(￿F = gjE3;aF = ns) = 0 (72)













. For the other three events, which are o⁄-equilibrium,
we assign P(￿F =gjEi;aF =s) = 0 for all i.18
Turning to t = 1, if the investor observes aF = ns he computes P
￿
E1
￿ ￿aF = ns
￿
;P(E2jaF =







= (￿F + (1 ￿ ￿F)￿M )P
￿
~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool
￿
(73)
P(E2jaF = ns) = 1 ￿ P
￿
~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool
￿
(74)
P(E3jaF = ns) = (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P
￿
~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool
￿
: (75)
18It will be clear in the sequel that these o⁄-equilibrium beliefs are consistent with the t = 1 o⁄-equilibrium
belief that P(￿
F =gja
F = s) = 0:
32In this equilibrium observing the fund not selling does not convey any information.
Hence, if the investor observes observes aF = ns, by retaining the fund he gets
(1 ￿ ￿)E
￿
P2 j aF = ns
￿
￿ 2w + E
￿









￿ ￿aF = ns
￿￿
P(￿F = gjE1;aF = ns)￿I






P(￿F = gjE2;aF = ns)￿I






P(￿F = gjE3;aF = ns)￿I




Simplifying we have that if the investor observes aF = ns and retains at t = 1 his expected
payo⁄ is
(1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ Ens(￿pool)) ￿ 2w + ￿ ￿I + ￿F (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P
￿





If at t = 1 he observes aF = ns and ￿res the fund his expected payo⁄ is
(1 ￿ ￿)P1 ￿ w + E(~ ￿I) = (1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ Es(￿pool)) ￿ w + ￿ ￿I: (79)
The investor would rather retain the fund when she does not sell if:
(1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ Ens(￿pool)) ￿ 2w + ￿ ￿I + ￿F (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P
￿





(1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ Es(￿pool)) ￿ w + ￿ ￿I (80)
i.e.,
￿F (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P
￿




b) ￿ w (81)
For a given ￿ and w, for ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b large enough, the investor would retain the fund if she
does not sell. Let us denote the relevant lower bound on ￿I
g ￿ ￿I
b as B￿￿(w;￿) which is
independent of ￿.
Now, let￿ s suppose that the fund sells at t = 1. This is an o⁄-equilibrium action for the
fund and we assign investor￿ s beliefs to be P(￿F = gjaF = s) = 019. Hence, he computes
P(E1jaF = s) = P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)￿M (82)
P(E2jaF = s) = (1 ￿ P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)) (83)
P(E3jaF = s) = P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿sep)(1 ￿ ￿M): (84)
19Our selected belief is consistent with a natural perturbation of the model in which a small measure ￿ > 0
of funds act naively: i.e., sell whenever they observe a = 1.
33We know from the above that in each of these events, the fund will be replaced at t = 2.
If the investor observes aF = s and ￿res the fund he gets
(1 ￿ ￿)P1 ￿ w + E(~ ￿I) = (1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ Es(￿pool)) ￿ w + ￿ ￿I;
whereas if he retains the fund his expected payo⁄ is:
(1 ￿ ￿)E
￿
P2 j aF = s
￿
￿ 2w + E
￿
~ ￿I ￿ ￿aF = s) = (1 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ Es(￿pool)) ￿ 2w + ￿ ￿I;
Therefore, the investor will always ￿re the fund. Thus, for ￿I
g￿￿I






r if aF = ns
f if aF = s:
(85)
It remains for us to show that the fund will choose not to sell regardless of whether she
observes a = 0 or a = 1.
If the fund observes a = 0 and chooses to hold, she is retained by the investor and thus
receives
2w + E(P2 j a = 0) + P(retained in t = 2)￿F = 2w + v + ￿F
If, instead, she sells, she is ￿red by the investor and thus receives
w + P1 = w + v ￿ Es(￿pool):
Clearly, she will choose to hold.
If, on the other hand, the fund observes a = 1 and chooses to hold, she is retained by the





~ ￿ j ~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool
￿￿




~ ￿ j ~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool
￿￿
:
Instead, if she chooses to sell, she is ￿red by the investor and thus receives
w + ￿(v ￿ Es (￿pool)):
Thus the fund will prefer not to sell upon observing a = 1 if




~ ￿ j ~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool
￿￿
; (86)
which can be rewritten as:
E
￿
~ ￿ j~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool
￿￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)P
￿






Clearly for a given ￿ as ￿
w gets small, the inequality holds and the fund does not sell even
when she observes a = 1. Let B ￿
w(￿) be the largest ￿





w < B ￿
w(￿).
Both inequalities (81) and (87) are satis￿ed. This concludes the formal argument.￿
Derivation of equation 66. Using the de￿nitions provided above we show that
E(~ a~ ￿ j aF = s) = Es(￿pool) = (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool) (88)





s if ~ l = ls;
ns otherwise
(89)
and the strategy of the manager is















































































= (1 ￿ ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿M)E(~ ￿j~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool)P(~ ￿ ￿ ￿pool):
Proof of Proposition 4: Referring to the proof of Proposition 1, recall that ￿(w;￿) =
w
B ￿
w (￿) is the lowest ￿ that satis￿es inequality (35). Choose a particular ￿ > ￿(w;￿) and
35then choose ￿I
g￿￿I
b > B￿￿ (￿;w;￿). Now it is clear that both (27) and (35) hold, completing
the construction of the equilibrium.￿
8.1 A Di⁄erent Formulation of Managerial Abillity
The purpose of this model is to show that allowing for exit as a positive signal of ability (which
can arise if blockholders di⁄er in their ability to obtain information about the perverse actions
of the manager) does not eliminate our core result that the career concerns of blockholders
will get in the way of discipline via exit. In particular, we show below that it is precisely
for ￿rms in which the moral hazard problem is most severe￿ and thus discipline is most
necessary￿ that (i) exit will be viewed as a positive signal of ability and (ii) simultaneously,
career concerned blockholders will engage in excessive exit, reducing the disciplining e⁄ect of
exit.
Consider the following model of delegated blockholding. Firms are indexed by i. In each
￿rm i there is a manager and a blockholder. Time runs over two periods t = 1;2. At t = 1,
the manager can take action a = 0 or a = 1, where 1 is the perverse action as before. The
manager￿ s payo⁄ is proportionate to the t = 1 share price. For any i, ￿rm value v is ￿ v if
a = 0 and v if a = 1, with ￿ v > v. The manager faces a moral hazard problem: if he takes
action a = 0 he sacri￿ces a private bene￿t ￿, where ￿ is distributed according to CDF fi(￿).
Only the manager knows ￿. The market has the prior belief fi(￿).
For any two ￿rms i and j, the the moral hazard problem will be greater in i than in j if
fi ￿rst order stochastically dominates fj. We loosely refer to ￿rms with greater moral hazard
problems as ￿rms with ￿high￿fi.
For any ￿rm i, at t = 1, the blockholder observes the manager￿ s action with noise. The
type of the blockholder determines the precision of this information. In particular, he observes
a signal ￿, with type dependent precision: Pr(~ ￿ = ￿j~ v = v) = Pr(~ ￿ = ￿ ￿j~ v = ￿ v) = ￿￿ for
￿ 2 fg;bg, where ￿g > ￿b > 1
2. Blockholders do not know their type. The measure of type
g blockholders is ￿g > 0. Upon observing the signal, the blockholder has the choice to sell
the block at t = 1 (aF = s) or to hold until t = 2 (aF = ns). At t = 1, there is noise in the
market, so that the blockholder may be mistaken with positive probability for a noise trader
who trades without information. At t = 2 all information becomes public. The blockholder
is a delegated fund manager whose action, as well as the ￿nal ￿rm value v are observed by
a principal, who can make Bayesian inferences Pr(￿ = gjaF;v). Denote by p1(s) and p1(ns)
the equity price for the ￿rm at t = 1 corresponding to the actions of the blockholder and by
p2 the full-information price at t = 2. The blockholder￿ s payo⁄ is given by
￿(I(aF = s)p1(s) + I(aF = ns)p2) + (1 ￿ ￿)Pr(￿ = gjaF;v);
36where I(￿) is the indicator function which is 1 if the argument is true and 0 otherwise. Thus,
￿ measures the weight placed on pro￿ts by the blockholder while 1 ￿ ￿ measures the weight
placed on career concerns.
What is the ￿rst best from the perspective of corporate governance? Since ￿g > ￿b > 1
2,
the information of blockholding funds is correct on average, the highest average discipline
(which minimizes the incidence of a = 1 by the manager) is for the blockholder to sell if and
only if ~ ￿ = ￿. We refer to this as the ￿rst-best. We ￿rst show that if ￿ = 1, the ￿rst-best is
an equilibrium irrespective of fi(￿). We then show that, for any ￿ < 1, for su¢ ciently high
fi, the ￿rst best is not an equilibrium.
Remark 6 For ￿ = 1, the ￿rst-best is an equilibrium irrespective of fi(￿).
Note that p1(s) 2 (E(~ vj~ ￿ = ￿);E(~ vj~ ￿ = ￿ ￿)) because of the noise in the market. If the
blockholder observes ~ ￿ = ￿ ￿, then his payo⁄ from selling￿ p1(s)￿ is lower than his payo⁄
from not selling￿ E(~ vj~ ￿ = ￿ ￿)￿ and he is better o⁄ not selling. If the blockholder observes
~ ￿ = ￿, the opposite is true: his payo⁄ from selling￿ p1(s)￿ is higher than his payo⁄ from not
selling￿ E(~ vj~ ￿ = ￿)￿ and he is better o⁄ selling.
Remark 7 For any ￿ < 1, for su¢ ciently high fi, the ￿rst best is not an equilibrium, and
there is excessive exit.
Suppose the ￿rst best is an equilibrium. Consider the manager￿ s incentives in an arbi-
trarily chosen ￿rm i. If the manager chooses a = 0, he receives
(￿g￿g + (1 ￿ ￿g)￿b)p1(ns) + (￿g (1 ￿ ￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿g)(1 ￿ ￿b))p1(s);
if he chooses a = 1 he receives
(￿g￿g + (1 ￿ ￿g)￿b)p1(s) + (￿g (1 ￿ ￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿g)(1 ￿ ￿b))p1(ns) + ￿:
Thus, he chooses a = 0 if and only if
￿ < ￿FB ￿ (￿g￿g + (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿b) ￿ (￿g (1 ￿ ￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿g)(1 ￿ ￿b))(p1(ns) ￿ p1(s)):
Note that ￿FB > 0 since p1(ns) > p1(s) and ￿g > ￿b > 1
2. Let ￿v = Pr(a = 0) = Pr(~ v =
￿ v) = fi(￿FB). High fi corresponds to low ￿v.
Now consider a blockholder who has observed signal ￿ = ￿ ￿. His payo⁄ from not selling is
￿E(~ vj￿ = ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)E(Pr(￿ = gjns; ~ v)j￿ = ￿ ￿) =
￿E(~ vj￿ = ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)[Pr(~ v = ￿ vj~ ￿ = ￿ ￿)Pr(￿ = gj￿ ￿; ￿ v) + Pr(~ v = vj~ ￿ = ￿ ￿)Pr(￿ = gj￿ ￿;v)]:
(91)
37His payo⁄ from selling is
￿p1(s) + (1 ￿ ￿)E(Pr(￿ = gjs; ~ v)j~ ￿ = ￿ ￿) =
￿p1(s) + (1 ￿ ￿)[Pr(~ v = ￿ vj~ ￿ = ￿ ￿)Pr(￿ = gj￿; ￿ v) + Pr(v = vj~ ￿ = ￿ ￿)Pr(￿ = gj￿;v)] (92)
Remarks:
1. E(~ vj￿ = ￿ ￿) > p1(s), but as ￿v ! 0;E(~ vj￿ = ￿ ￿) ￿ p1(s) ! 0:
2. Pr(￿ = gj￿ ￿; ￿ v) > Pr(￿ = gj￿; ￿ v) and Pr(￿ = gj￿ ￿;v) < Pr(￿ = gj￿;v).
3. As ￿v ! 0 Pr(v = ￿ vj~ ￿ = ￿ ￿) ! 0 and Pr(v = vj~ ￿ = ￿ ￿) ! 1.
Thus, combining these three remarks, we have that, ￿xing ￿, there exists a ￿v2 (0;1)
such that if ￿v <￿v, the blockholder will prefer to sell instead of not sell. Thus, the ￿rst best
is not an equilibrium, because there will be excessive exit.
It is clear that ￿v is decreasing in ￿, so more career concerned blockholders will engage
in more excessive exit.
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